Wall Street Journal
By MARIAN L. TUPY and DAVID COLTART
March 14, 2008
Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary elections on March 29 are rigged
in favor of the incumbent leader Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front. Much ink has been spilled on the electoral
prospects of his two opponents — Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the
Movement for Democratic Change, and former Finance Minister Simba Makoni.
But neither have a realistic chance of winning, for Mr. Mugabe knows that
the most likely alternative to the State House in Harare is a prison cell at
The Hague.
The case against Mr. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF for crimes against humanity
would be compelling. They have turned one of Africa’s most prosperous and
relatively free nations into an Orwellian nightmare. Since 1994, the average
life expectancy in Zimbabwe has fallen to 34 from 57 for women and to 37
from 54 for men. Some 3,500 Zimbabweans die every week from the combined
effects of HIV/AIDS, poverty and malnutrition. Inflation and unemployment
are at 150,000% (no misprint here) and 80%, respectively. The country has no
freedom of speech or assembly, and the government has used violence to
intimidate and murder its opponents. In the meantime, Zimbabwe’s delusional
leader rails against non-existent Western plots supposedly concocted by
George W. Bush and Tony Blair.
By right, Mr. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF should have been voted out of office
long time ago. But one of Mr. Mugabe’s first steps after gaining power was
to root out all threats to his rule. In August 1980, newly elected Prime
Minister Mugabe asked Kim Il Sung, the North Korean dictator, for help in
setting up a special army unit devoted to quelling Zimbabwe’s internal
dissent. Paradoxically, the potential dissenters Mr. Mugabe wanted destroyed
were not the tiny minority of white Rhodesians, but his comrades in the
fight for a majority rule — the Zimbabwe African People’s Union.
A self-declared Marxist with his sights set on the creation of a one-party
state, Mr. Mugabe knew that ZAPU and its charismatic leader Joshua Nkomo
could become his only serious opposition in the long run. In 1983,
therefore, Mr. Mugabe sent his North Korean-trained death squad into Nkomo’s
stronghold in the Matabeleland, where they killed some 20,000 civilians.
This massacre eviscerated ZAPU’s strength and sent Nkomo into exile. In
1987, he agreed to merge his party with ZANU in exchange for the largely
meaningless title of Zimbabwe’s vice president.
Mr. Mugabe’s strategy worked. With minimum opposition, he maintained his
hold on power until the birth of the Movement for Democratic Change in 2000
following Zimbabwe’s disastrous intervention in the Congolese civil war and
the ruling party’s gross economic mismanagement. Since then, the strength of
the opposition had forced Mr. Mugabe to adopt an array of ever-more
repressive and economically destructive measures.
Mr. Mugabe’s desperation is understandable. The moment he loses power, he
could quickly find himself in the dock. The new government would, no doubt,
come under tremendous pressure to ensure that Mr. Mugabe stands trial for
his crimes. An exile to a friendly country, like Angola or Malaysia, had
been rumored, but is unlikely. Charles Taylor was lured out of the Liberian
presidency in 2003 with a promise of a comfortable life in Nigeria. Three
years later, he was flown to The Hague where he has been fighting for his
freedom ever since.
The candidacies of Messrs. Tsvangirai and Makoni might be hopeless, but they
are not meaningless. A fraudulent election will further undermine Mr.
Mugabe’s legitimacy. It will energize the opposition’s local structures and
allow it some representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament.
Importantly, it will open the possibility of another five-year term for
Zimbabwe’s octogenarian leader and further economic decline. That prospect
may force the more enlightened parliamentarians from the ZANU-PF, many of
whom are quietly hoping for Mr. Makoni’s victory, to jump ship and join the
opposition.
In the event of popular protests, the attitude of the army and the police
will be crucial. Mr. Mugabe has spared no expense to buy the loyalties of
the officer class, but the rank-and-file is poor, hungry and disillusioned.
Considering that Mr. Mugabe cannot afford to give up power, he will try to
hang on. He may then find himself in charge of a paper tiger and unable to
stop a surge of public resentment against his rule. If that takes place, let
us hope it will be fast and bloodless.
Mr. Tupy is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global
Liberty and Prosperity. Mr. Coltart, a member of the Zimbabwean parliament,
belongs to the Movement for Democratic Change.