The Gorbachev Factor

By David Coltart
Bulawayo
8th November 2007

The recent passage of Constitutional Amendment 18 through the Zimbabwean Parliament with the consent of both Zanu PF and the opposition MDC has caused much alarm and confusion within Zimbabwean civil society and even amongst MDC supporters within Zimbabwe and abroad. Some have gone so far as saying that the opposition has sold out. Others think that the opposition has made a serious error of judgment and has compromised not only principle but political advantage. This arises from a perception that Amendment 18 only helps Zanu PF and that there is no benefit for those struggling to bring democracy to Zimbabwe. The press has enhanced this view by its reporting that Amendment 18 allows Robert Mugabe to handpick his successor.

Whilst I think we in the opposition did ourselves and our colleagues in civil society a disservice by proceeding with unseemly haste in passing the amendment, and by failing to explain our actions sufficiently to our colleagues, I do not think our consent per se was a mistake. There is no doubt that the process used to pass the amendment was flawed. But had we been able to consult widely and argue our case with our civic partners I am sure they would have agreed that we should consent. Accordingly save for the one reservation about the flawed process I think history will show that it was the right thing to pass the amendment.

Firstly, the amendments, to put it negatively, do not introduce any worse provisions than any that already sully our Constitution. In other words the amendments do not make the Zimbabwe Constitutional order any worse than would have been the case had the original draft of Amendment 18 tabled by Zanu PF been passed. That document would have, for example, allowed further gerrymandering of the delimitation process (the original amendment proposed the existing 20% maximum variation between constituencies to be increased to 25% – which would have allowed Zanu PF to create even more rural constituencies and to further dilute the urban vote).

Secondly, and on the contrary, the final Amendment 18 has introduced several improvements to our Constitutional order. For example aside from a token 5 Senatorial seats, the President no longer has the power to appoint members of the legislature – all 210 Members of Parliament will be directly elected by the Zimbabwean electorate as will the vast majority of Senators. This is a welcome break from the provisions in place since 1987 which have allowed the President to handpick 20% of Parliamentarians.

Concern has been expressed about the alleged power now given to the President to handpick a successor. In fact Amendment 18 grants no such power. Prior to the amendment if the President died, resigned or was impeached a Presidential election would have to be held within 90 days of the termination of his or her office. Amendment 18 now states that Parliament will elect a successor pending the next scheduled election, which is similar to the position in South Africa and the United Kingdom. This is better in some respects to the relevant US provision which allows the US Vice President to assume office for the balance of the original term. Accordingly the new Zimbabwean provision is a logical and fair provision designed to ensure that elections are held at predictable times and that all parties will have some say in the election of a temporary Head of State.

However perhaps the main fear about the amendment is that it is part of a process which will allow Zanu PF to wriggle out of the hole it has dug for itself. There is deep concern that Zanu PF, through the Mbeki mediation, will agree to a variety of legislative changes without materially changing the political environment. In other words people fear that we may in the next few months witness a much fairer legislative environment being agreed to without genuinely free and fair electoral conditions being created. We may see, for example, our media legislation amended which in theory will allow independent papers to operate freely, but which in practise will not be implemented early enough to enable independent papers to have a material effect on the electoral process.

In the short term these are valid concerns. There is a real danger that the Mbeki mediation process will result in all the form of a free and fair electoral environment being created without any substance. We may well in the short term see the implementation of a new democratic constitution without a democratic environment being created prior to the elections scheduled for 2008. It will take time for constitutional and legislative amendments to take root and change the way we conduct our politics in Zimbabwe. 27 years of oppression has created a certain mindset within the Zimbabweans electorate. It will take time to liberate the minds of Zimbabweans. The concern of many is that if elections are held too soon Zanu PF will be able to claim legitimacy through a process which has a democratic façade but which in reality does not allow for a genuinely free expression of the informed will of the electorate.

Many are worried that by agreeing to Constitutional Amendment 18 the opposition has helped Zanu PF create a mere façade of democracy. Only time will tell whether this is the case. Much depends on whether the Mbeki mediation results in an acceptable period being agreed to between the promulgation of a new Constitution (and other laws) and the holding of Presidential and Parliamentary elections. There is no doubt that if an election is held too soon after the passage of these new laws it cannot not be free and fair. Moreover Zanu PF, in the event of it winning, would be able to claim legitimacy having been elected in a theoretically free and fair environment. In that event the agreement to Amendment 18, and for that matter any agreement regarding the rest of any new legislative changes arising out of the Mbeki mediation, will be seen in the short term to have merely bought time for an oppressive regime.

Let me assume for the moment that this is what does in fact happen over the next few months; that the opposition is forced to agree to an unacceptably short period between the passage of new legislation and the holding of elections and that that results in a Zanu PF victory which is endorsed by SADC at least as legitimate. Will that automatically mean that Amendment 18, and indeed our participation in the Mbeki mediation process as a whole, was a terrible mistake?

That leads me to the third and final argument why I think the opposition has not erred. I believe in the medium to long term it will shown that even in this worst case scenario the opposition was correct to act in the manner it has. This is for one reason – which I will term the “Gorbachev Factor”.

Mikhail Gorbachev never wanted to destroy the Soviet Union or communism. As President of the Soviet Union and leader of the Communist Party he was committed to the preservation of both institutions. However with the collapse of the Soviet economy in the 1980s he realised that if he did not make certain political reforms he would not be able to hold Soviet Union together. It was in this context that he agreed to the new policies of Perestroika “comprehensive rebuilding of society” and Glasnost “candour or openness”. It was his hope that through the moderate liberalisation of Soviet society he would be able to hold on to power and keep the Soviet Union intact. However history shows that once he started the process of reform, the process then ran away from him and he was left powerless in controlling the course it followed. Ultimately both perestroika and glasnost led to the destruction of the Soviet Union and the near collapse of the Communist Party.

One of the reasons why this happened is because the core of the Soviet Union was so weak that once laws were liberalised it became impossible for the core of the Communist Party to control every aspect of governance. This stands in marked contrast to the the Communist Party in China which has been able to implement economic and some political reforms without adversely affecting its political control. The difference in outcome lies in the fact that the Chinese started liberalising their economy long before the core of their political power became undermined. The Chinese in essence anticipated the need for economic reform whereas the leaders of the Soviet Union reacted to the need for economic reform.

Zanu PF has, ironically, not followed the example of its Chinese mentors. It has tried to maintain tight controls over the Zimbabwean economy for 27 years. It never wholeheartedly liberalised the Zimbabwean economy at a time when it was politically powerful enough to withstand the turmoil which sometimes accompanies such reforms. It is now reacting to the collapse of the economy by agreeing to the implementation of political reforms – but it is too little and too late.

Accordingly I have no doubt that we will see the Gorbachev Factor unfold in Zimbabwe over the next few years, if not in the course of 2008. Whilst Amendment 18 may well result in Zanu PF gaining the legitimacy it craves in an election next year, it will not in itself provide any solution to the collapsed economy and the thoroughly weakened political core of the Zanu PF regime. The new Constitution and other new laws will require the regime to liberalise society. The terms for economic assistance which will be insisted upon by international financial institutions will do likewise.

Once these terms are implemented Zanu PF’s remaining control over Zimbabwean society will unravel. For example when the current dual exchange rate is abolished, Zanu PF’s principal means for dispensing patronage to the ruling elite will end. That in turn will end its last remaining core of support because it has already lost the support of Zimbabwean workers, the business sector and the rank and file of the civil service and the military. And the same will apply to every single aspect of governance.

In conclusion the opposition has in my view been correct in participating in the Mbeki mediation and in agreeing, as part of that process, to Constitutional Amendment 18. Whilst that may not in itself yield any change in government in the short term, it has introduced the Gorbachev Factor to our political climate and that will ultimately be the catalyst for far reaching political and economic changes in Zimbabwe. We have in essence now unleashed a process that no-one will be able to stop.