Mr Coltart said that it was a reflection of the state of our “democracy” that the last report-back meeting scheduled to be held in Barham Green had been banned. Two other meetings: one a Christian meeting and the other to be hosted by Bulawayo Dialogue had both been similarly banned. The last six months had seen deterioration in the Zimbabwean environment in many different ways. People across the board had been affected and the level of gloom and depression was unprecedented. Inflation had reached 300%; there continued to be a dramatic emigration of skills and a variety of institutions were under great threat. Where such high levels of repression existed, it was inevitable that everyone was depressed. When people awakened in the morning, they immediately had to confront these enormous strains in their lives.
Ironically, this stressful situation had been further unintentionally compounded by the actions of the MDC, who had wrongly raised expectations. Some of the language relating to the mass action had been deliberately positive … it had been referred to as the “final push”. Telling people to turn out in their millions had created expectations that a dramatic miracle would occur in the space of five days, which was hoped for but which did not materialise. Mr Coltart had felt that the stay-away would be a success, but had experienced reservations about the prospect of thousands of people turning out to confront the regime. The regime was vicious and levels of fear intense. What had happened in June should rather be described as the beginning of the final push.
The stay-away in March had been a gamble. Fortunately, people had responded and had sent out a powerful message internationally. This had emboldened Zimbabweans. A five day stay-away (such as that that took place from 2nd to 6th June) was a very long time, and no civic or political organisation had succeeded before in doing this in Africa. It had been a huge gamble asking people to stay away in their thousands. Wealthy people and the middle class had been able to cope, but poor people without fridges and without stocks of food had struggled. The Wednesday morning of the stay-away had been the real test. At first it seemed to be waning, but then it strengthened by the end of the week. Expectations had also been raised about people turning out in their thousands and hundreds of thousands to protest, but state repression prevented that.
There had been increased levels of brutality; increased levels of torture and an increase in the number of people being detained: signs that the regime was redoubling its efforts to oppress the Zimbabwean people. In the 1930’s Dietrich Bonhoffer had opposed the Nazis and Hitler. He had been detained in the early 1940’s in Berlin. Two weeks prior to the collapse of Nazi Germany, far from releasing him, they had taken him to a concentration camp and had shot him. This was one example of a tyrannical regime that got more vicious the closer it got to its demise. One would expect such a regime to decrease its human rights abuses as it came closer to its end. Increased oppression, however, was a desperate move to quell the opposition. Ironically, we should feel encouraged by this. The shortage of bank notes, the lack of fuel and the increase of human rights abuses were all signs of a regime on its last legs.
The reality was that ZANU PF was weaker and the opposition stronger. The lowest ebb of the MDC was reached in January this year. Zimbabwe had disappeared completely from the international radar screen. Mr Coltart had been staggered by the arrogance displayed by ZANU PF during December 2002. They were confident that the MDC would lose both Harare by-elections: those in Kuwadzana and Highfield, and that they would be able to crush the MDC.
In December, the NCA had called for stay-aways, which had been a total flop.
But, from the beginning of February 2003, things had changed dramatically.
Ironically, two events that ZANU PF had thought to capitalise on had had the opposite effect. The first was the treason trial, and the second was the World Cup Cricket. The intention of ZANU PF was to use the treason trial to put the MDC on the back foot. They intended to show the world that Morgan Tsvangirai was involved in some nefarious activity. They had seen the treason trial as something to relish – an opportunity to get the focus back on the characters of Morgan Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube. This was precisely what had happened, but not in the way they had anticipated. From the dock, Morgan Tsvangirai had been able to shut down the country twice. Having George Bisos to represent Morgan Tsvangirai and the others accused of treason had been a masterstroke, as constant linkage was made between Nelson Mandela’s trial and this one. Mr Bisos was a fine advocate, who exposed evidence that relied on the testimony of a scoundrel. The trial did not show ZANU PF in a good light especially in the minds of South Africans, but most importantly, it drew international attention back to Zimbabwe.
With regard to the World Cup Cricket, Mr Coltart had found himself at the time in a moral dilemma. It had been clear that the morally correct stance was for countries to decline to come to Zimbabwe. Yet, it was anticipated that, if national teams came, the world’s attention would be focused on Zimbabwe, and the country and the situation here would merit a couple of useful days’ coverage. As it happened, the benefit derived from the teams coming here was immense. The World Cup, in a powerful way, focused the world’s attention on Zimbabwe, and won us a powerful ally in the Caribbean block. It was Henry Olonga’s statement and his subsequent treatment that led to their allying themselves with Jim McKinnon’s successful attempt to extend Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Council of Ministers in the Commonwealth. Huge benefit was derived from ZANU PF’s treatment of a sporting icon. Thus, in February, the world’s focus was back on Zimbabwe.
In March and April, Zimbabweans needed to demonstrate to the international community that they were not happy. While the international community was deeply sympathetic, it was hamstrung in a variety of international fora, needing tangible evidence of the people’s dissatisfaction. The stay-away in March changed its attitude.
It had become clear that people were not acting in good faith, and that certain leaders in Africa were paying lip service to calls for justice in Zimbabwe and trying to ignore the MDC. After the stay-away, they could no longer do this. The stay-away led to the extension of the Commonwealth ban. The MDC went on to confound its critics and the prophets of doom by winning the two Harare by-elections. Mr Coltart had not expected the MDC to win these – because of massive electoral fraud.
The significant event in March was the Iraq war, an event of short duration. At the commencement of the war, both sides in Zimbabwe gambled. ZANU PF nailed its colours to the mast early on in the proceedings. Jonathon Moyo indicated publicly that the ZANU regime was against what was happening. Mr Coltart reminded us of the way the Zimbabwean soldier, who died in Iraq, was treated by the regime.
In contrast, Morgan Tsvangirai, on the day after the war started, when addressing diplomats at a meeting, thanked the United States for promoting democracy in his country for the last few decades. In the early days of the war America was very isolated. We had nailed our colours to the right mast. This was the right and principled thing to do. It was necessary to rid the world of dictators and terrorism. Colin Powell telephoned Morgan Tsvangirai in acknowledgement of the friendly statement made by him in a time of need. This regime did not understand just how deep the wound created by the destruction of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon was. The stand taken by ZANU PF was noted by the American administration and would bode ill for them. If one was seen to support the American government, as had been the case with the MDC, then enormous benefits would flow. Long term ramifications would be evident.
In May, the first effects of the stay-away were seen in the reactions of Presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki and Maluzi. President Mbeki met Morgan Tsvangirai for the first time. These leaders stated that they wanted to meet someone who was on trial for allegedly wanting to assassinate a fellow “President”. Their action undermined the entire treason trial. This would never have happened, but for the May stay-away and the two by-elections which forced Mbeki’s hand. For all the support that the anti-apartheid movement achieved, they never closed down a single city in South Africa and Mbeki simply could not ignore the MDC’s power.
The stay-away resulted in a knee-jerk reaction from the regime. Instead of trying to ignore it, they arrested Morgan Tsvangirai at the beginning of the week, just before the G8 Conference was to take place. Then at the end of the week on Friday, the last day of the five-day stay-away, they detained him again. Their action once again focused media attention on Zimbabwe.
Everyone was desperately concerned for him and about his treatment in prison. The reality of the situation, however, was that his detention had raised his profile and stature. This was especially so in Zimbabwe. He had been unfairly criticised for not leading the mass action more vigorously. The attitude of the people changed to one of sympathy, as they realised that the road to State House went through prison.
In June Colin Powell wrote an article in “The New York Times” likening Morgan Tsvangirai to Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the opposition in Burma and a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Mr Powell’s article was one of the most significant pieces of writing concerning Zimbabwe to come out since the struggle. “The New York Times” sets the benchmark of American opinion. Attention would thus be focused on Zimbabwe, just before President Bush embarked on his first trip to Africa. President Mbeki had staked his reputation on NEPAD and hoped that billions of US$ flowing into Africa would boost his domestic standing.
From the low point in January, a progression of events had led us to a situation where the regime in Zimbabwe was in reactive rather than in proactive mode. “The Chronicle” of Monday 23 June featured a collage of photographs of Mr Mugabe’s rally in Kezi. Behind him on the dais was a huge sign that said “No to Mass Action – Enough is Enough”. A political party needed to focus on its own message. In the last few months, ZANU PF had been drawn into our territory and was re-acting to our policies as in their “No to Mass Action”. Their message was no longer “Down with the Whites” and “Land for the People”. Marketers’ skill lay in creating concepts and slogans that were easily remembered. Thus the coverage that the MDC was getting in “The Chronicle” and “The Herald” was incredible. The MDC’s name was being mentioned all the time. One should not raise the profile of the enemy, a trap ZANU PF had fallen into. The MDC was setting the agenda. It had shut down the country and had been responsible for bringing out the airforce. On the Saturday morning (after the stay-away ended at 5pm on the Friday), the helicopters went back to their bases. The power to call out helicopters and to keep them at base thus lay with Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC.
Admittedly, Mugabe did control the military, but he did not control the people. The following were two examples of the way ZANU PF was trying to control the situation:
- They had embarked on a series of campaign meetings, an indication that they were feeling jittery. They were looking for encouragement, so shaken were they by the success of the stay-away. Threats of closure of businesses had not worked. People had been bussed to the meeting at Kezi – they had been forced to attend the meeting. Their mood had been one of silent dissatisfaction.
- Nathan Shamuyarira had announced that he was going to discuss a Government of National Unity. This was a positive development, as it was the first sign of major weakness, very different from their attitude in December. Whilst the MDC would never participate in a Government of National Unity it was a sign that ZANU PF was now forced to deal with the MDC.
Mr Mugabe had flown to Libya to try to source fuel. He would not be able to resolve the economic fundamentals, even if he succeeded in the short term.
The economic situation was unsustainable. It was inevitable that if the productive sector was interfered with and productivity stopped and if the flow of foreign exchange was brought to a halt, the economy would collapse. Inflation would continue to rise and bank notes would become even more scarce. Only through this economic trial would this regime be brought to its knees.
What was the way ahead? Mr Coltart said that we were close to the end of the nightmare. Economic collapse was speeding up and international pressure was building. This would lead to the collapse of the regime and to a restoration of democracy, the ultimate solution to our problems.
There had to be a transitional authority. The best solution would be for Mr Mugabe to resign and for a new election to be held in 90 days. The bottom line was for a transitional authority to have a finite term of office and a limited mandate. There must not be a Government of National Unity.
Under a transitional authority, Zimbabwe could not be governed in terms of POSA and other such restrictive laws. Humanitarian relief must be allowed into the country. Early signs of serious malnutrition were being seen in children in some rural areas. While some areas had surplus crops, experts agreed that there was, overall, a massive food deficit. Because the regime was living a lie, it had not taken the measures it needed to take in terms of humanitarian aid. Our contact with the rest of the world must be restored. The electoral playing field must be levelled, so that a free and fair election could take place.
America had called for exactly the same conditions as those mentioned above: Robert Mugabe’s resignation, transitional authority and new elections. The United States had the power to call on African leaders to help to resolve the crisis.
Prior to 1976, Ian Smith was talking of “Never in a Thousand Years….”. But after a meeting with Kissinger in Pretoria, he was forced to return speaking of majority rule. Huge pressure had been brought to bear. This was a typical example of the pressure and power the US is able to exert with regard to the Zimbabwean impasse. This pressure will result in a solution to the crisis.
Mr Coltart said that we must remain true to our principles, the two most important being non-violence and the determination to go through the courts, even though they had been subverted. He said that if we had moved into Robert Mugabe’s territory of violence, we would have been removed long ago. He said that we had all been put to the test. Fifty-two of the fifty-seven MP’s elected had been subjected either to detention, torture, oppression or imprisonment. Despite this, the core of the MDC had remained intact. Whilst in Zimbabwe, we were all hanging by a thread, we needed to go the final lap in our goal of bringing democracy to this country.
p-Dated After A Further Meeting On 7 August 2003
Since its formation on 11 September 2003, the MDC had been subjected to a baptism of fire: an unrelenting and vicious assault by ZANU PF, who had tortured, abducted, kidnapped and murdered its members. Almost four years on, the MDC was not crushed; in fact the core of the party was stronger than ever. Council elections were to be held in Bulawayo at the end of August. The MDC was in control of the cities in Zimbabwe, where 30/40% of the population was to be found. The cities generated over half the GDP in the country, and therefore were an important power base. There was great danger, however, that in the current climate of economic collapse, depression and apathy would prevail, a situation that would adversely affect voter turn-out. (Urban councils the world over were blighted by voter apathy.) ZANU PF would be delighted if there was a poor turn-out. They must not be allowed to win by default.
Mr Coltart reminded the meeting that Martin Luther King had said “Freedom never comes without some form of sacrifice”. Zimbabweans had never known true representative democracy. Bulawayo’s elections were yet another step towards this goal. The development of democracy was an incremental process.
Question Time
The MDC would not enter into a Government of National Unity. After what happened to ZAPU in the 1980’s such a government was against the national interest. ZANU PF was responsible for the absence of fuel, food and money. They had created all the problems we were facing today. The MDC would not be prepared to go down that route and be swallowed, as ZAPU was, only to have its bones spat out and its leadership corrupted. The Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project was a pipe dream. Not two sods of earth had been turned at the confluence of the Gwaai and the Zambezi. Yet for ten or twelve years the subject had been talked of constantly and numerous promises had been made. Nothing had happened. Significantly, only a small percentage of the students at NUST, our University in Bulawayo, came from this region.
The MDC envisaged a Transitional Authority – a Government of National Unity would simply be a continuation of ZANU PF. A Transitional Authority (not a Government) had a limited mandate and would exist for a finite period, during which it would govern the country. It would be a mandate to take the country through to free and fair elections. It was imperative that the country be stabilised, law and order restored, the police force de-politicised, the youth militia disbanded and the way paved towards adhering to the SADC standards for free and fair elections.
With regard to the meeting between Presidents Bush and Mbeki in South Africa in July, ZANU PF had spewed out a lot of propaganda and lies. Mr Coltart had been in South Africa at the time and had had two meetings with the Bush administration team. Two very clear agreements had emerged from the Press Conference given by the two presidents. Both men acknowledged that the Zimbabwean crisis required urgent resolution. Both stated that they shared the same objectives. President Bush had certainly not changed his objectives. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had clearly set out how the crisis needed to be resolved. Mugabe needed to stand down, there should be a transitional authority and free and fair elections needed to be held. Bush repeated these conditions in Botswana. President Mbeki had never said what his objective was. He had spoken of “quiet diplomacy”, but had never offered a “road map”. In essence, free and fair elections in the country were needed to resolve the crisis. President Bush had said that he was not going to second-guess President Mbeki, but had referred to him as “my point-man”. This term was a reference to American football and to an active not a passive role. He meant you are the person in the region, and you must run with this. Bush had said that he believed that President Mbeki could be an honest broker not that he was an honest broker. They would be reviewing the situation in September. Bush had, in fact, secured two key concessions. We could expect to see close co-operation.
ZANU PF was desperate for the MDC to recognise the legitimacy of Robert Mugabe as President of Zimbabwe. The MDC had said that IF the International Community endorsed talks and they got underway and IF there was tangible evidence of ZANU PF’s demonstrating good faith, then the MDC would consider suspending the Presidential Challenge. The trial was due to start only in November, so this gave interested parties a three-month window. The Presidential Challenge was the best non-violent, lawful leverage the MDC had, and so it would not be discarded lightly.
Contracts entered into by ZANU PF that were not considered to be in the best interests of the country would not be honoured by the MDC. The MDC had built a huge body of evidence that clearly demonstrated how the election was stolen from us. The aim for the future was for Zimbabwe to have a government that represented the majority of the people and not a tiny, rich, corrupt elite.
ZANU PF was engaged in a vigorous process to elect a new leader. It had been claimed that Robert Mugabe would stand down from his party position in December. It should be noted, however, that this was different from standing down as president. The South Africans, the MDC understood, wanted an election in Zimbabwe as early as March, not June, since the ANC had to fight an election themselves in June. The MDC would fight an election only if the electoral process conformed to SADC and international standards.
It was interesting that President Mbeki’s concluding remark was to thank President Bush for agreeing to invest in Zimbabwe’s “transitional’ current crisis ie rehabilitation.
No investor would invest in Zimbabwe until we restored our judiciary.