Understanding the Zimbabwean crisis: A first step in planning its recovery

By David Coltart

The sudden and dramatic collapse of Zimbabwe in the last decade has perplexed many in the international community. Furthermore the seemingly intractable nature of the crisis has caused some to believe that Zimbabwe is doomed to become a failed state in Africa. How can it be that a country, which in the late 1950s had an economy larger than Singapore, which at independence in 1980 had the second strongest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, can be reduced to the basket case status it is in now?

Economic collapse

The economic statistics are startling. The purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean in 2005 has fallen back to the same level as in 1953 when the then the Confederation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established. 52 years of progress has been undone in less than a decade. Real GDP fell almost 30% from 2007 to 2003 and that trend has continued through 2004 to the present. As the graph below shows Zimbabwe is now in its ninth consecutive year of negative growth rates.

Agriculture

Not surprisingly every sector of the formerly diverse Zimbabwean economy has been devastated. The mainstay of the economy, agriculture, has been destroyed by the politically expedient and often violent land reform programme initiated by the Zanu PF government in 2000. For example annual wheat production has plummeted from a high of over 300000 tonnes in 1991 to less than 50000 in 2007 – production almost one third of what it was over 30 years ago, in which period the population has more than doubled.

The Tobacco industry, which used to be the single largest generator of foreign exchange, accounting for almost a third of all Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings in 2000,has all but collapsed. The crop which earned some US$ 600 million in 2000 generated under US$ 100 million in 2006.

Manufacturing

Manufacturing has shrunk by more than 51% in the last decade. Manufacturing enjoyed a period of reasonable growth from 1994 to 1999, and if this had been maintained post 1999, manufacturing employment could easily have exceeded 250 000. However, the government’s inability to balance successive budgets in line with the requirements of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) meant that government had to compete with the private sector for the available funds on the domestic market. This forced interest rates higher, soon making the cost of borrowing too high for manufacturers. However, commercial profits were readily achievable and the increased inflow of foreign funds as part of the ESAP provided easy access to imported consumer goods. Commercial importers were assisted by the strengthening of the Zimbabwe dollar over those years. Local manufacturers therefore found themselves under attack from the rapid increases in local costs, particularly interest rates, and the decreasing demand for their goods as competition from imports increased. Investment patterns swung from manufacturing to commerce.

Since 2005 the Manufacturing sector has been further damaged through government’s policies, particularly as a result of the law requiring exporters to sell a portion of their foreign exchange earnings to the Reserve Bank at an artificially pegged rate of exchange which is, as at 1st September, approximately 1/1000th of the real market value. The final blow to the manufacturing sector has come from the government’s price control policy announced at the end of June 2007. In an effort to stem runaway inflation the government arbitrarily announced that prices would be halved, in an environment in which inflation is running at in excess of 10,000% per annum. As a result in the two months following the implementation of the new policy manufacturing output has plummeted further and many manufacturing firms are facing closure.

Mining

Zimbabwe is blessed with some of the best mineral reserves in the entire world. It has vast deposits of iron, nickel, platinum, coal, chrome, asbestos, diamonds, tantalite , coal bed methane and gold. Mining, which should have been enjoying a boom period in the last decade in the wake of the Chinese induced rapid rise in mineral prices, has, with one notable exception namely platinum, all but collapsed as well. Gold is a good example. Zimbabwe is estimated to have over 3.5 bn tonnes of gold still stuck beneath its soils. More than 90% of these deposits are located in the granite-greenstone terrain which covers about 60% of the country. Zimbabwe has over 6000 recorded deposits and the capacity to produce at least 25 tonnes of gold annually. World Gold prices have been steadily increasing during the last decade. Despite this gold production within Zimbabwe has plummeted in the last decade and in 2006 Zimbabwe suffered from the lowest annual output since 1907.

As in the Manufacturing sector the Gold Mining sector has been a victim of the government’s determination to pay unrealistic prices, linked to the government’s official rate of exchange. As a result the sector has become unviable. Virtually every other mining sector is similarly affected; for example coal production dropped to its lowest level since 1946 in 2006.

Tourism

Zimbabwe is also one of the most beautiful countries on earth. It not only boasts one of the 7 Wonders of the world, the Victoria Falls, but also has some of the best game reserves in Africa, stunning mountainous areas and an almost perfect climate. However as a direct result of the racist hate speech directed against white people in general by the Zanu PF government and the oppressive and often violent political atmosphere most foreign airlines flying into the country a decade ago have stopped and tourist arrivals have plummeted. Consequently annual foreign earnings are now less than 1/10th of what they were a decade ago.

Informal sector/Operation Murambatsvina

Even the informal sector of the economy has not been immune from the government’s predations. In May 2005 the government embarked on what it termed “Operation Murambatsvina ” (roughly translated as “clean out the filth) aimed at the urban poor. In the course of some 2 months some 700,000 of Zimbabwe’s poorest urban based people were either deprived of their incomes or driven out of their homes. The United Nations condemned the action of government and focussed most of its attention on the humanitarian impact on human rights violations . However it did note that in 1980 the internal economy of Zimbabwe was relatively small, accounting for less than 10% of the labour force. This was attributed to the various laws and bylaws that prohibited the movement of indigenous people, especially from rural to urban areas. With deregulation after independence and economic stagnation and declined, the informal sector share of employment grew to about 20% by 1986/1987, to 27% by 1991 and to an estimated 40% by 2004. The internal economy had effectively become the mainstay for the majority of Zimbabweans. The ILO reported in June 2005 that all those million Zimbabweans earned their living through informal sector employment, supporting another 5 million people, while the formal sector employed only about 1.3 million people. Accordingly although Operation Murambatsvina was directed against poor people its impact on the formal economy was severe. The informal sector of the economy has not recovered to pre May 2005 levels. Remaining employment in the formal sector is also dropping rapidly.

The country’s economy is now in free fall. Inflation, according to official (and thus very conservative) government figures, now exceeds 7000% per annum. Respected economists believe that inflation is more probably in excess of 20 000% per annum. To put this in perspective, the world’s next highest inflation rates are those of Myanmar (Burma) at 70% a year, and Iraq at 40%!

The humanitarian crisis

The human cost of Zimbabwe’s economic crisis has been catastrophic. Over 80% of Zimbabweans are now unemployed. The estimated proportion of the population living below the official poverty line has more than doubled since the mid 1990s and is now over 80% of the population. The country’s human development indicators have sunk to the lowest first percentile in the world.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) recently reported that people living in Zimbabwe now have the lowest life expectancy in the world. Since 1994 the average life expectancy for women in Zimbabwe has fallen from 57 to 34, and for men from 54 to 37. The WHO believes that life expectancy rates will continue to fall. It is estimated that some 3 500 people die every week in Zimbabwe through the deadly combination of Aids, poverty and malnutrition. To put that in a global context, a recent report stated that some 700 people a week were dying in Iraq. Another publication said that some 400 000 people have died in Darfur since 2003: this can be compared with the estimate that about 600 000 Zimbabweans have died during the same period.

According to findings released in October 2006 by the Zimbabwe Demographic Health Survey (ZDHS), child mortality in the country has nearly doubled, rising from 59 per 1 000 live births in 1985 (five years after Zimbabwe gained independence) to 102 per 1 000 live births in 1999. The under-five mortality rate has continued to rise, with 129 per 1 000 in 2004, according to United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) figures. The situation has become graver since 2004, when the economy plummeted further. An additional factor that might be expected to increase mortality rates is the forcible displacement of some 700 000 people during Operation Murambatsvina. According to the UN report, a great number of these were children. Accordingly it is reasonable to assume that child mortality rates have risen sharply since 2004.

These shocking facts are the result of the unique convergence of three factors in Zimbabwe: the Aids pandemic and the government’s failure to address it; severe economic decline; and high levels of malnutrition, which the government refuses to acknowledge.

Aids and the Zimbabwean government’s failure to deal with the pandemic

In a report released in June 2006 by James Morris, the Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN stated that Zimbabwe has one of the highest incidences of HIV/Aids in the world. Southern Africa is in fact the epicentre of the global pandemic. Nine of the 10 countries with the highest levels of infection in the world are to be found in Southern Africa. Zimbabwe is one of them.

What makes Aids particularly life-threatening in Zimbabwe is the fact that the government has dedicated the bulk of its dwindling resources to maintaining its hold on power, instead of providing the antiretroviral (ARV) drugs necessary to combat the disease. It is estimated that only a tiny fraction of those people suffering from HIV/Aids are on regular courses of medication. Mugabe’s regime prefers spending money on keeping its own people at bay to saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens. In the 2006 budget an amount equivalent to 12.5% of the total allocation for health was awarded to Zimbabwe’s equivalent of Stasi, the Central Intelligence Organisation. On top of this, the share allocated to the military was greater than that for health. This trend in the government’s thinking is underlined by its recent announcement that it is about to import new military aircraft from China. This is defence spending in a country which is not at war, and which is surrounded by friendly states.

High levels of malnutrition, and a government which refuses to acknowledge the extent of the problem

The WFP recently reported that some 4 million Zimbabweans will need food aid within the six months. On the 9th August 2007 the Famine Early Warning System Network (Fewsnet) stated:

“Protracted economic decline, exacerbated by a poor 2006/07 harvest, as well as current and potential future disruptions of food supply due to recent price controls and eminent restrictions on basic commodity imports have caused a significant decrease in Zimbabwe’s food security, especially in the southwest and in urban areas. WFP and C-SAFE tentatively plan to import about 352,000 MT of food aid to feed 4.1 million people. While it is conceivable that maize import requirements could be met, the GMB’s ability to distribute maize is a serious concern, as, in the past, GMB distributions have been erratic, and local shortages are common.”

Human rights organisations within Zimbabwe believe that the figure of 4 million is an underestimation because of the impact of poverty on so many Zimbabweans who are at best nominally employed. People who previously would have been able to buy food for themselves are no longer able to do so, and millions of urban poor are visibly losing weight. Yet these people are not included in WFP estimates because they are considered to be in employment.

The Zimbabwean government has deliberately downplayed the extent of the crisis over the last few years, for political and propaganda reasons. This compounds the problem. The administration has tried to control the supply of food because in doing so it is able to use food as a political weapon. In this way desperate people, especially in the rural areas, can be coerced into voting for the ruling Zanu-PF party.

Furthermore, if the government were to acknowledge the full extent of the problem, especially in a year (such as 2006) when there have been good rains, that would be tantamount to an admission that the food shortages are a direct result of its chaotic and corrupt land reform programme. This has resulted in highly productive farms being rendered derelict by the government ministers, party operatives, army commanders and judges who have taken them over. Furthermore the government consistently refuses to admit the gravity of the problem, and on various occasions in the last few years has been deliberately obstructive towards the WFP and other humanitarian agencies, preventing them from operating freely in Zimbabwe.

In a television interview President Mugabe gave in 2004, he said that Zimbabweans did not want to ‘choke’ on international food aid, which they did not need. At the same time NGOs were barred from distributing food, and the government insisted on controlling all food distribution. This policy continued until the March 2005 general elections had been held. The net result was that millions of Zimbabweans over the last few years have been deprived of access to the food supplied by international agencies. Given that Zanu PF has now announced that there will be a general election in March 2008 it is likely that it will employ similar tactics as it did in 2005 to control the supply of food to desperate people.

The historically unique convergence of economic collapse, aids and malnutrition

Never before has there been the convergence of severe economic collapse, high levels of HIV Aids infection and chronic malnutrition in one country. Zimbabweans are suffering under the unique convergence of the fastest declining economy of the world, rampant Aids (exacerbated by the scarcity and for most absence of medication) and serious food shortages. In short more people are dying every week from preventable causes than are dying in Iraq and Darfur. The tragedy however is that they are dying silently and bloodlessly. . It is not surprising that Zimbabweans now have the lowest life expectancy in the world. Yet it is particularly shocking when one remembers that Zimbabwe is not a desert. As stated above in the 1950s its economy was larger than Singapore’s. Until relatively recently it was the second-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. This is not a Liberia or a Somalia. This has been a preventable tragedy – and an even worse disaster is still preventable. The situation can be turned around within months; hundreds of thousands of lives could be saved and an entire region stabilised.

The world is looking the other way

The Zimbabwean crisis is compounded by the fact that world is showing little interest in the country’s agony. This is attributable to a number of factors. First, although it is arguable that more people are dying in Zimbabwe through the unique combination of factors mentioned above than in Iraq, Afghanistan and Darfur, Zimbabwe hardly rates a mention in the world’s media. Part of the reason is that this is a story that is difficult to film or to write. The country offers very few stark images likely to capture the world’s attention. A casual visitor to Zimbabwe will not see blood flowing, or many children with kwashiorkor bellies. There are no car bombs. People who die through a combination of Aids, poverty and malnutrition die quietly; they literally fade away. The only means of getting any sense of the extent of the catastrophe is by visiting morgues and cemeteries. These are overflowing. The most poignant evidence of the calamity is to be found in the dates inscribed on headstones and plaques in the cemeteries – the vast majority of people being buried there are young people and children.

Secondly, although they are allowed in Darfur, Afghanistan and Iraq, the foreign media are generally barred from operating in Zimbabwe by the government. There are draconian laws that forbid foreign journalists from working in Zimbabwe without permission, which is rarely given. Journalists are routinely detained in Zimbabwe, and the laws relating to the media prescribe prison terms for those who infringe their stipulations. Media organisations like the BBC and CNN are effectively banned from Zimbabwe. As a result the story of Zimbabwe’s human tragedy is simply not being told. But unless the world’s media put the catastrophe at the top of their agendas, there will be little public pressure on governments elsewhere to take up Zimbabwe as a political cause.

Thirdly, because Zimbabwe has no oil and very few strategic mineral resources, there is no obvious strategic reason why the world powers should want to focus their attention on its troubles. Whilst Zimbabwe does have large reserves of platinum, these are not in sufficiently short supply globally to warrant special attention from the international community. Tragically for Zimbabweans, the only interest that the country’s platinum has aroused internationally is that of the Chinese, who have been prepared to prop up Mugabe’s regime in order to secure privileged access to the mineral.

Fourthly, the response of most Southern African governments and SADC to the catastrophe unfolding on their doorstep is best described as a state of denial or paralysis.

In summary the humanitarian crisis is being allowed by the international community to spiral out of control. In fairness many governments simply do not know what to do and are exasperated by the seemingly intractable problem. However to provide an effective prescription for Zimbabwe’s humanitarian and economic ills one must appreciate the real causes of the disaster.

The Political crisis

Zimbabwe’s humanitarian and economic crises are rooted in politics. The Zanu PF government has been at pains over the last few years to blame economic collapse on the combination of Western sanctions and drought. Even SADC at its recent Heads of Government meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia, in August 2007 blamed sanctions and drought for the crisis.

In reality whilst both of these factors have the exacerbated matters they are not the cause of the problem. Targeted Western sanctions imposed by the United States of America, the European Union and a few other countries only came into effect in 2002 some five years after Zimbabwe’s economic collapse started in 1997. Furthermore this is not the first time that Zimbabwe has had to endure international sanctions. In 1966 the United Nations imposed general trade and economic sanctions on the illegal white minority government of the then Rhodesia. Despite the imposition of those sanctions, which lasted until the restoration of legitimacy and the attainment of majority rule in 1980, the Zimbabwean economy was remarkably strong in 1980 and the Zimbabwe dollar at the time was stronger than the US dollar. It should be stressed that the UN sanctions were far more comprehensive in scope than those currently in place. Whilst the Zimbabwe and Democracy and Economic Recovery Act does, for example, oblige the government of the United States of America to vote against the extension of any loans by international financial institutions, there are no general trade sanctions currently in place, nor are there ever likely to be any.

Likewise, as Craig J. Richardson has pointed out in 2005, the historically close relationship between rainfall and GDP growth sharply disconnected in 2000, the first year of the land reforms. Years subsequent to 2000 show above-average or average rainfall, even as the economy continued to plummet. Richardson shows that the drop in rainfall in the 2001-2002 growing season (which suffered a drought) contributed to less than one-seventh of the overall economic downturn.

In truth the root of Zimbabwe’s woes is the absence of democracy. In his book Development as Freedom, the Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen stresses the causal connection between democracy and the absence of famine. He makes the point that there has never been a famine in the recorded history of any country which has a free press, to support the claim that a free press and an active opposition constitute the best early warning system a country threatened by famine can have. In other words, the failure or non-existence of democracy usually results in economic collapse, and that in turn invariably leads to such humanitarian catastrophes as famine. Zimbabwe is a classic case in point.

There are three pivotal issues which are directly responsible for the calamitous situation faced by Zimbabwe today.

The Lancaster House Constitution

Zimbabwe has been built on a very shaky democratic foundation. Decades of oppressive white minority rule did not yield a truly democratic constitution and environment when Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980. The Constitution which emerged from the Lancaster House Conference was a compromise document primarily designed to bring a bloody civil war to an end. It allowed the continuation of many oppressive aspects of white minority rule to continue including tight state control over the media. Crucially it reinforced excessive executive power and resulted in a relatively weak legislature and judiciary. In the result whilst racial discrimination was abolished, in many other respects the new Zanu PF government from the very beginning exercised the same authoritarian powers as its predecessor the Rhodesian Front had. Significantly these powers were exercised with Western support from day one of Zanu PF’s rule.

The Lancaster House Constitution created the template for authoritarian rule. It initially allowed Robert Mugabe to consolidate his power and that of Zanu PF. Once power was consolidated it was then monopolized. As Lord Acton observed in 1887 “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. No words hold truer for Zimbabwe today and the genesis of Zimbabwe’s current woes are found in the document which allowed Robert Mugabe to exercise absolute power in Zimbabwe, as he has done for almost 3 decades.

Gukurahundi

Through a combination of being seduced by then Prime Minister Mugabe’s policy of reconciliation towards the white community and a desire to keep the new Zanu PF government out of the clutches of the Soviet bloc, the West embraced the new government wholeheartedly. In 1981 a donor conference was convened which resulted in a massive amount of development aid pouring into Zimbabwe with very few good governance conditions attached to it. Soon after taking power in April 1980 Prime Minister Mugabe had engaged in secret negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung to create an army unit specifically designed to deal with “internal dissent”. These negotiations culminated in October 1980 in an agreement in terms of which North Koreans would train and arm a new brigade to deal with “malcontents”. The training of the new brigade began during the last few months of 1981. Prime Minister Mugabe addressed the final passing out ceremony of the new named the “Gukurahundi Brigade”. Gukurahundi is a Shona language expression meaning the rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains. In his address Prime Minister Mugabe said

“The knowledge you have acquired will make you work with the people, plough and reconstruct. These are the aims you should keep within yourself”.

The Gukurahundi, or 5 Brigade as it is more commonly known, was deployed into Matabeleland in January 1983. It then was primarily responsible for a genocide committed against the civilian population of Matabeleland and Midlands. It is generally accepted that approximately 20,000 people were murdered at the hands of the 5 Brigade in1983. This is the figure first used by nationalist leader, and later Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo, in 1984 and accepted by human rights organisations as being if anything conservative.

The grave human rights abuses and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Zanu PF government under Prime Minister Mugabe (if not the full extent of the genocide) were well reported on in the West and known by Western governments and NGOs by as early as March of 1983. Despite the knowledge of these grave crimes the West turned a blind eye. Western aid continued to flood in, Prime Minister Mugabe was awarded honorary doctorates at Western Universities and as late as 1994 then President Mugabe had an honorary knighthood conferred on him by the British Government.

The failure of the West to act against the Zanu PF government, or even to condemn the atrocities, created a sense of impunity in the minds of the Zanu PF leadership, which has had a direct bearing on the events of the last few years. The Zanu PF regime not only got away with genocide in the 1980s but was actually rewarded in the years which followed through the continued infusion of substantial aid and other awards. In this context it is not surprising that the Zanu PF leadership believed that it could act with complete impunity when it commenced its violent land reform programme in 2000. Similarly, whilst its policies are indefensible, one can understand why Zanu PF perceives the West’s reaction to its policies since 2000 as racist; in its mind the West turned a blind eye to the massacre of thousands of black Zimbabweans in the 1980s but has imposed sanctions following the killing of a handful of white farmers and a few hundred opposition activists since 2000.

Tragically Gukurahundi still haunts the entire nation and is pivotal to understanding what motivates the Zanu PF government and President Robert Mugabe today. President Mugabe is uniquely in possession of two critically important pieces of intelligence which undoubtedly dominates his thinking. Firstly, only he and his immediate circle, including the current military commanders, know precisely what their role in the Gukurahundi was. In other words only they know in detail what their culpability is. They also know that with the loss of power will follow the full revelation of their involvement and culpability. Secondly, because of their unique access to present streams of intelligence through the all pervasive Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) President Mugabe and his military commanders know the depth of anger still simmering just beneath the surface in the communities which suffered under Gukurahundi.

Moreover President Mugabe has undoubtedly watched how Charles Taylor and other despots have been treated in recent years once they lost power. He must be fully aware that the moment he loses power, and with it Presidential immunity from prosecution, there may be a deluge of information regarding the full extent of what happened during Gukurahundi, his role in it and a concomitant push to have him, and the responsible military commanders and politicians at the time, indicted for Crimes against humanity or genocide.

Because of this the loss of power by President Mugabe is anathema not only to him, but also importantly to a key circle of military and political leaders who are equally culpable for Gukurahundi. In their mind they cannot risk yielding an inch of power because the consequences of the loss of power are unthinkable. In other words to understand the Zimbabwean crisis one must assume that President Mugabe and his inner circle will do whatever necessary to retain power. Furthermore this common fear acts as a powerful bond which unites all those responsible for Gukurahundi. To this extent the Zimbabwean crisis must be distinguished from, for example, the final years in power of President Moi of Kenya. In many countries throughout the world the trappings of office become addictive and politicians have to be prized away from office. President Moi never feared ending up in The Hague and so whilst he lost the trappings of office, he had nothing else to fear. Whilst President Mugabe undoubtedly enjoys the trappings of his office, the biggest block to change is the collective fear felt by the ruling elite of the consequences of losing political power.

Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)

The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of apartheid in the early 1990s saw Zanu PF lose some of its leverage over the West. There is no doubt that the need to keep Zimbabwe out of the Soviet sphere of influence and the need to use the Zimbabwean “reconciliation” experience to allay white South African fears regarding post apartheid South Africa, greatly influenced Western foreign policy towards Zimbabwe in the 1980s, especially regarding turning a blind eye to Gukurahundi and Zanu PF’s authoritarian inclinations. However with those Western fears removed Zanu PF became more vulnerable to Western criticism and declining Western aid support. At the same time the Zimbabwean economy was faltering and with the post independence honeymoon definitively over the Zanu PF government faced growing opposition from trade unions and student organisations in the late 1980s/early 1990s. The Zimbabwean government had to do something to bolster the economy.

It was in this context that the Zanu PF government embraced the IMF’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). In 1992 the first of the IMF’s disbursements was made in the sum of US$ 216 million; further amounts of US$ 65 million, 76 million and 75 million followed in 1993, 1994 and 1995.

The international community was provided with a unique opportunity at this juncture to change the course of Zimbabwe’s future by insisting that financial assistance be linked to substantial political reforms. In May 1991 I argued this in a seminar conducted by KPMG:

“Economic liberalisation and political protectionism are incompatible. It goes without saying that trade liberalisation and structural adjustment cannot work in a vacuum. The experience of the world is that genuine democracies have the strongest economies. Economic liberalisation will not work in Zimbabwe unless Government abandons its policy of political protectionism. I need to stress that I am not saying that economic liberalisation will not work in Zimbabwe. I am simply saying that unless Government is encouraged to bring about genuine democracy in Zimbabwe and liberalise the political environment the long-term economic outlook for Zimbabwe will be bleak.”

“Without the free flow of information even if controls in the economy are relaxed corruption will continue to flourish. Corruption can only be stifled if there is a free flow of information, through ongoing investigative reporting which exposes corruption. I believe that corruption is an epidemic which if allowed to continue will undermine the entire economy and it is therefore imperative, if trade liberalisation is to work, that it be brought under control.”

“The history of Africa and other developing countries shows that undemocratic Governments are inevitably followed by increased corruption, increased inflation and eventual economic decline. The only people who flourish are the Government Ministers, the externally based shareholders of multi-nationals and the privileged few Chief Executives of locally based companies who have managed to illegally obtain foreign currency. Because of this I believe that if we are genuinely interested in a future in Zimbabwe and a sound economic outlook we need to take a serious long term view and consider what we as business people can do to ensure that economic liberalisation is accompanied by political liberalisation.”

“I believe that unless these points are seriously considered … a bright economic future in Zimbabwe will at the least be severely retarded if not reversed completely.”

In a trip to Washington in the summer of 1992 I raised similar arguments – namely that before substantial IMF loans were advanced there should be verifiable commitments made by the Zanu PF government to liberalise the media, to cut back on military spending, and generally to take steps to democratise the country. My entreaties were ignored and the IMF, with the backing of Western governments proceeded to advance relatively large loans with very little obvious democratic quid pro quos from the Zimbabwean government.

Two consequences flowed from the manner in which ESAP was implemented which still reverberate today. Firstly, Zanu PF was allowed to consolidate its power at a critical time when it could have been persuaded to change course. In doing so it bought itself time but simultaneously any chance that the consolidation of its power could have been used to democratise Zanu PF as a political institution was cut off. Secondly, the wealth that flowed to the political and business elite created a more obvious economic gulf between the ruling elite and its supporters, in particular war veterans.

In short the failure to liberalise Zimbabwe’s political system in the unique environment created in Southern Africa in the early 1990s laid the foundation for the turmoil that followed later.

1997

Three events occurred in 1997 which set the stage for the tragedy which started to unfold in 2000. Firstly, war veterans loyal to Zanu PF became increasingly disgruntled with the widening gap between themselves the ruling elite. In an effort to placate them President Mugabe agreed to pay them huge unbudgeted pensions and other benefits. Secondly, in an effort to protect mining investments made by members of the ruling elite in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Mugabe ordered the deployment of thousands of Zimbabwean troops to the DRC to prop up the regime of Laurent Kabila. Thirdly, towards the end of the year the government finally moved on its threat to acquire vast tracts of land held by white commercial farmers.

The combination of these three events led to the dramatic crash of the Zimbabwean dollar in November 1997 and the beginning of the downward spiral of the Zimbabwean economy. This in turn spurred trade unions and civil society to step up plans to create a broad based political opposition which culminated in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change in September 1999. This in turn provided Zanu PF with its first real political opposition since the demise of Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU party in December 1987.

An overview of political situation 2000 – 2007

Since 2000 the Zimbabwean crisis has captured the attention of the world’s media and the political drama which has unfolded has been well-documented. Because of this no attempt will be made in this paper to systematically document all that has happened since 2000.

Constitutional referendum 2000

Zimbabwe’s decent into chaos caught many governments and investors by surprise. The Zanu PF government had build up an elaborate façade of democracy over many years and Robert Mugabe himself was considered by many to be an icon of liberation. Even Zimbabweans had become accustomed to the slight opening up of democratic space in the late 1990s which accompanied the national debate in 1998 and 1999 regarding a new constitution. The debate culminated in a national referendum which was held in February 2000. That plebiscite was conducted in the most tension free atmosphere the nation had ever experienced. There was no violence, or threat of violence and those opposed to the government’s proposed draft constitution were freely able to meet and campaign against it. The government lost the referendum with 57% voting against the government’s draft constitution. President Mugabe appeared on national television shortly after the result and whilst he said he would accept the result he was clearly shocked and apoplectic.

With the benefit of hindsight it is now clear that Zanu PF completely miscalculated the organisational ability of the civic body which coordinated the “no” vote, The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), to penetrate the rural areas. It had been assumed that the NCA only held sway in the urban areas where a minority of the electorate resided. Even more shocking for Zanu PF was the realisation that a huge swing vote comprising some 500,000 commercial agricultural labourers had overwhelmingly voted “no”. With a general election scheduled for April 2000 Zanu PF was suddenly thrown into disarray because it faced the real prospect of losing that election and power. Furthermore the success of the NCA in winning the vote gave a huge boost to the newly formed MDC party.

At this juncture it is important to make the point that since 1980 Zanu PF has been more concerned with the retention of power than with pure ideology. Although it started out as a Marxist organisation its leaders readily embraced the fruits of capitalism soon after taking power, and readily adopted stringent IMF prescriptions in the 1990s. Accordingly the promotion by Zanu PF of a relatively democratic draft constitution in 2000 was consistent with this approach. It appears their thinking was that a slight democratisation would not undermine their ultimate control of the country.

Since the 2000 Referendum Zimbabwe has experienced the systematic tearing down of the elaborate façade of democracy carefully constructed by Zanu PF in the first two decades of its rule; in direct correlation to its sense of vulnerability Zanu PF started gradually eroding civil liberties. In doing so Zanu PF has acted reactively rather than in accordance with a deliberate, well calculated plan, implemented in accordance with a well defined ideological vision. The only underlying premise has been the need to do whatever is necessary to hold on to power. Zanu PF has achieved this by employing two broad tactics, firstly by attacking whatever institution is deemed to support the opposition, and secondly by maintaining its core support through the acquisition of assets for the benefit of its supporters.

June 2000 Parliamentary election and its aftermath in the run up to the 2002 Presidential election

The loss of the referendum brought into sharp focus the fact that Zanu PF could lose power, and that the only way to reverse the situation was to break the opposition’s ability to organise and mobilise the huge commercial agricultural worker’s swing vote. Zanu PF recognised that the urban vote was a lost cause, but given that the majority of voters were rural it could still win an election comfortably if all rural voters supported it. However in the referendum farm workers and employers had joined forces to vote against the government and it they were allowed to do so in the Parliamentary election they would tip the balance in favour of the opposition.

Accordingly the elections scheduled for April 2000 were postponed and Zanu PF commenced a systematic policy of disrupting the opposition’s ability to organise in commercial farming areas. Almost overnight Zanu PF supporters, spearheaded by war veterans, and coordinated by the military, started invading farms. Initially farm workers were targeted for harassment but as that failed to break the opposition’s ability to organise so the violence was gradually notched up. The first murders of opposition activists occurred in early April 2000. The first murders of white farmers occurred in mid April. The first two murders of white farmers, one in the north of the country, the other in the south west were chillingly well and gruesomely executed – designed to strike fear into the hearts and minds of the farming community. The tactic worked and by the time the election was finally held in June 2000 although the opposition swept the board in the urban areas (obtaining an average of over 75% of the vote), support for the opposition in the rural areas was undermined and Zanu PF narrowly won the election (securing 62 of the 120 seats contested).

In the latter half of 2000 both the opposition and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) turned to the courts for redress. The opposition filed over 30 electoral challenges to seats won by Zanu PF. The CFU obtained a landmark judgement in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the government’s land reform programme. In 2001 the government responded to this course of action by turning its attention to the judiciary. By mid 2001 the Chief Justice, Antony Gubbay, had been hounded out of office and replaced by a judge sympathetic to government. The original judgement obtained by the CFU was reversed and the newly constituted Supreme Court rubberstamped government’s blatantly unlawful land reform programme. During the same period two Acts were passed by Parliament, the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act and The Land Acquisition Amendment Act to give “legal” cover to those in illegal occupation of farms.

In the course of 2001 the rest of the judiciary was systematically undermined and as a result the electoral challenges brought by the opposition were deliberately delayed to ensure that ZANU PF candidates who had won illegally did not lose their seats. Towards the end of 2001 ZANU PF turned its attention back towards the opposition MDC party in the immediate run-up to the 2002 Presidential election. In November 2001 several MDC leaders and activists were detained on trumped up charges. Immediately prior to the March 2002 Presidential election three new Acts were passed by Parliament, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (designed to hinder the opposition’s ability to organise meetings), the General Laws Amendment Act (designed to facilitate rigging of the election) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (designed to intimidate and if needs be shut down the independent print media). At the same time senior army officers were brought into manage the electoral process. Shortly before the election senior army officers held a press conference saying they would not serve under the opposition Presidential candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai. Finally, a few weeks before the election, Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested on treason charges.

According to the official results Robert Mugabe won the 2002 poll by 418809 votes. The election itself was marred by numerous irregularities and condemned by a wide variety of international organisations and governments. A subsequent audit of the electoral materials revealed massive irregularities and pointed to Robert Mugabe having lost the election, albeit by a narrow margin .

The aftermath of the 2002 Presidential election leading up to the March 2005 election

Just as the 2000 Referendum result came as shock to Zanu PF so too did the 2002 Presidential election result. In the run up to the election Zanu PF and state agents had murdered, tortured and intimidated the opposition for two years. The commercial farm workers’ organisational structures had been disrupted and farm owners generally intimidated into withdrawing their support for the MDC. Despite all of this the opposition’s support in urban areas had been maintained and it had started to make inroads into non commercial (communal) rural areas. Significantly although some farmers had been summarily evicted from their farms, the majority of white commercial farmers were still in occupation and producing.

It is at this juncture that Zanu PF decided that more needed to be done if they were to remain in power. Whilst no serious political commentator would dispute the obvious historical inequities in land holdings and the need to redress them, it is doubtful that Zanu PF initially never intended to destroy completely white commercial agriculture in the way it has. In statements made in the 1980s and even as late as 2001 Zanu PF spoke about acquiring some 8 million hectares of white owned land (against the some 14 million hectares owned by white commercial farmers in 2000). In Parliament, during debates regarding Land Acquisition Act amendments, Ministers repeatedly denied that the intention was to ethnically cleanse Zimbabwe of white commercial farmers. However immediately post the 2002 election a major policy shift appears to have been made by Zanu PF – it became clear to them that for so long as a significant number of white commercial farmers remained on the land the slide in their rural support would continue.

The decision was now made to retain power at any cost, even at the cost of completely destroying the economy. In April 2002 systematic evictions of farmers started countrywide. A new amendment was passed to the Land Acquisition Act rendering farm owners’ continued occupation of farms illegal. In August 2002 wholesale arrests of farmers still in occupation were made. Increasingly cabinet ministers, judges, army commanders and other members of the Zanu PF elite were allocated the most productive farms in the country and they moved on to them, often using coercive means to do so. Any pretence that the land reform programme was predominately meant to address the plight of landless peasants was swept aside. The ruling elite started cherry-picking the best farms, even going to the extent of displacing war veterans and peasants who had occupied the farms before them.

The attack on the opposition MDC continued with the legal system, especially POSA and law enforcement agents, increasingly used as a weapon. Much of the focus against the opposition centred on the treason trial involving Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube, which ultimately culminated in their acquittal in November 2004 after a prosecution spanning almost 3 years. A March 2004 report showed that 90% of the MDC Members of Parliament elected in June 2000 had suffered some human rights violation, 24% of them had survived murder attempts, and 42% had been tortured. Three MDC MPs died during this period as a result of injures sustained by attacks on them by state agents. At the same time the systematic killings, torture and detention of MDC supporters continued such that by the end of 2004 over 600 MDC supporters had been murdered often by known state agents. Thousands more had been tortured, assaulted or harmed. Since 2000 not a single suspect has been tried let alone convicted for any of these crimes.

Significantly in 2003 AIPPA was finally used to shut down Zimbabwe’s only independent daily newspaper The Daily News. In 2001 the Daily News’ printing press had been destroyed by a bomb but remarkably it had managed to continue publishing. However in September 2003 AIPPA was used to remove the licence the paper needed to continue operating.

In the course of 2003 and 2004 another weapon, the selective distribution of food, started being used in earnest countrywide by Zanu PF. Maize (corn) is the staple diet of most Zimbabweans. While most maize has been grown on small-scale communal farms, these farmers also kept most of their crops for their own consumption. The bulk of the maize that was marketed through the state-run Grain Marketing Board was produced by the large-scale commercial farmers until they were dispossessed of their properties under the land reform programme. Since 2001, Zimbabwe has had to import close to – sometimes more than – a million tonnes of maize every year to make up for the shortfall.

As the large scale growers’ operations were closed down, the loss of business affected the many service suppliers, warehouses, distributors and workshops that used to operate from all the small farming area towns. As most of these have been forced to close, the loss of their services has severely affected the communal farmers who used to rely on this commercial support, and the same decline has undermined all the efforts to make successful farmers of all those allocated land in the former commercial farming areas.

With shortages of the staple becoming the norm, in 2004 Zanu PF imposed tight controls on the sale and distribution of maize, effectively giving itself control over the distribution of increasingly scarce maize. This proved to be particularly effective political weapon in the run up to the 2005 Parliamentary general election.

Although a few token changes were made to the electoral laws all the main legislative components to enable the manipulation of the electoral process were maintained for the March 2005 election. Not surprisingly whilst the opposition retained every single urban seat in the election (save for one) it lost ground in the rural areas. Because of the failure of the judicial process following the 2000 and 2002 elections the opposition did not mount any serious legal challenge to the results.

Post 2005: Operation Murambatsvina and economic freefall

Despite all the depredations visited on it by Zanu PF over 5 years the opposition retained effective control of every urban centre post the 2005 election. In reaction to this in May 2005 Zanu PF launched Operation Murambatsvina against the urban poor who formed the core of the opposition’s support base. As mentioned above in the course of 2 months some 700,000 people were rendered income less or homeless. In doing so the economy was dealt another devastating blow.

In August 2005 the final seal was placed on the fate of white commercial farmers with the passage of Constitutional Amendment No 17 Bill through Parliament, which removed any remaining right commercial farmers had to have the courts adjudicate over the acquisition of their properties.

Shortly after, in October 2005, the opposition MDC party split, partly as the result of stage agents infiltrated into the party. As at August 2007 the opposition remains divided and accordingly relatively weak. In this context one might think that ZANU PF is now stronger than ever.

However the government’s policies have now rebounded against itself. Although it has destroyed the judiciary and the white commercial farming sector and has severely weakened the opposition, its main enemy is now the economy, and in particular inflation and rapidly rising government domestic debt. In 2006 inflation and domestic debt started to soar and both are now uncontrollable.

Because government tax revenue remained severely under pressure as a result of precipitous falls in economic activity during recent years, the budget deficit seemed certain to rise well above the already unacceptable levels. In his January monetary policy review, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe proposed a solution: the Social Contract.

His original intention was to achieve agreement between business, labour and government within the month of February and launch an effort to hold price, wages and government’s demands on the economy constant from March 1. However, the achievement of a workable degree of unison took longer, and the signing of the necessary Protocols took place on June 1 2007.

The Protocols were on Incomes and Pricing Stabilisation, The Restoration of Production Viability, and on Mobilisation, Pricing & Management of Foreign Currency. The Reserve Bank’s apparent intention was to capture the intended regulatory mechanisms in a final document that would be given the force of law through the publication of Statutory Instruments and its implementation date would then be set.

However, by mid-June the rising demand for foreign exchange had moved its costs on the parallel market sharply higher. Moving from Z$35 000 to one US dollar in mid-May to Z$50 000 by the end of May, and then to Z$120 000 by mid-June and Z$200 000 by June 20, the rapid slide prompted most traders to factor the rising figures into their replacement cost forecasts and into their immediate price levels. Fuel prices were always the quickest to respond to the exchange rate changes, and these were quick to influence the prices of all goods, whether imported or locally produced.

The government reacted by accusing the business sector of being part of a “regime change” agenda. In actions that over-ran and demolished the Social Contract negotiations, government ordered a 50% cut in the prices of basic commodities and, backed by militia groups, police launched raids on businesses to ensure that they were complying with the order.

However, the “order” was issued through the medium of the Press and formalised in a rudimentary and legally flawed Statutory Instrument on July 6, a week after the start of the very punishing, expensive, unfair and arguably highly illegal action. This document required that all manufacturers and traders should reduce prices to those ruling as at June 18. However, many businesses had much lower prices imposed on them by police officers, who claimed to have the necessary authority.

Thousands of managers were detained countrywide. At the same time, in a practice reminiscent of the farm invasions, the army, police and Zanu PF supporters stormed shops and availed themselves of goods worth billions of dollars which were “sold” at prices determined by so called Price Control authorities which were a fraction of the real value. Inevitably supplies have dried up and as at the end of August the inventories of most retailers and wholesalers countrywide had been dramatically reduced. This has in turn rapidly exacerbated the humanitarian crisis with food becoming scarcer than ever.

The government has now announced that it proposes to enact through Parliament a new “Indigenisation Bill” which is ostensibly designed, 27 years after independence, to rectify injustices caused by white colonial rule. As it is framed at present it will oblige every business to be controlled by (through a minimum 51% shareholding) “indigenous Zimbabweans”, which in terms of the Bill means any non white Zimbabwean. The net effect of this measure will be to ensure that no white person can ever own a business in Zimbabwe again. It will also ensure no foreign investor can ever control a business in Zimbabwe again.

It is viewed as another measure designed to ensure that largely urban based businesses (which have generally supported the opposition) are transferred into the control of people more sympathetic to government. If the land reform programme is anything to go by it will also be used to perpetuate Zanu PF’s pool of patronage. Just as the main beneficiaries of the land reform programme have been the ruling elite so too is it likely that lucrative white and foreign controlled businesses will end up in the hands of the ruling elite. Likewise if the land reform programme is anything to go by it is reasonable to assume that these businesses will be run down as badly as formerly highly productive farms have been by the ruling elite in the last 7 years.

Zanu PF’s determination to retain power has caused the catastrophe

As stated above Zanu PF is more concerned with the retention of power than the pursuit of any ideology. In pursuit of this goal since 1997 it has systematically sought to destroy the commercial farming sector, the independent judiciary and the political opposition – the three groups it perceived as its main opponents. In doing so it has caused millions of Zimbabwe’s best educated citizens to go into economic exile which has further undermined every sector of Zimbabwe’s economy. It has further exacerbated the crisis by
adopting short term, expedient economic measures which have spurred inflation. It is now set to destroy the remaining surviving sectors, business and manufacturing, which will further harm the economy. The further collapse of the economy will heighten the humanitarian crisis, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle the nation is in.

The world’s worst current humanitarian crisis?

The net result of Zimbabwe’s pitiful descent into chaos is that it is now arguably the scene of the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis at present, and whilst crimes against humanity have been and are being committed by the government, the world is looking the other way. In doing so it is guaranteeing that the crisis will escalate at a horrifying rate.

Whilst the ruling elite is largely unaffected by the economic melt down its Achilles heal is that the military and Zanu PF rural supporters are increasingly restive. Zanu PF is also badly divided within itself with many opposed to Robert Mugabe standing again as President in the elections scheduled for 2008. Accordingly despite the catastrophe and the weakness of the opposition and civic society, there are compelling factors at play at this time which give the international community significant leverage to settle the crisis.

This is not the first time that Zimbabwe has found itself in a critical situation. It faced similar problems in 1976. Then it took the active involvement of the USA and South Africa to break the impasse. Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in the Rhodesian Front finally conceding to the principle of majority rule. While that did not yield an immediate settlement of the country’s political dilemma, it at least set in train a process that resulted in intense diplomatic activity and ultimately the Lancaster House agreement, arrived at three years later.

There are two important differences between the present situation and that prevailing in 1976. Firstly, in the mid-seventies South Africa was highly susceptible to Western pressure; and, secondly, the USA and Britain were not engaged in any other wars at the time, and so could focus on Zimbabwe’s affairs. Whilst in the current climate South Africa is under pressure to resolve the crisis (especially because it is starting to hurt its own economy), its leaders have to balance any action they take regarding Zimbabwe against the support the Zanu- PF regime still receives from the majority of Southern African Development Community (SADC) states. For this reason any settlement encouraged by South Africa must enjoy the backing of other major African states.

At present both the USA and Britain are so heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan that they simply do not have the capacity to play a meaningful role in the resolution of Zimbabwe’s problems. That position is compounded by the fact that the Zanu-PF regime has successfully persuaded many other African states of the merit of its propaganda line that the USA and Britain are interested only in ‘regime change’ (rather than a democratic process that will culminate in a new constitution and free and fair elections). Accordingly the USA and Britain are not well positioned to engage in regional shuttle diplomacy in Africa.

In the circumstances there are two countries that can make a difference, and should be actively engaged in resolving the crisis. These are South Africa and Germany. The need for South Africa’s involvement is obvious; Germany’s potential role is less so. The latter occupies a unique position in Southern Africa in that it adopted a very strong stance against apartheid, was not Zimbabwe’s colonial master, and has not been involved in the Iraq war. Because of the strong opposition to the Iraq war expressed by many African governments and because of the concerns already mentioned (that the USA or the UK may have a ‘regime change’ agenda for Zimbabwe), the latter can exert only a limited influence on Southern African states. They are therefore unable to encourage them to take a more proactive role in helping to resolve the situation in Zimbabwe.

Germany does not suffer from any such handicap. A stable Southern Africa (which is now under threat because of the collapse of its second-largest economy) is in the strategic interest of both the EU and the G8. Chancellor Merkel could use her leading roles in both and work vigorously with partner governments in Southern Africa to end the Zimbabwean crisis. Another factor is that Germany has considerable investments in Southern Africa and in South Africa in particular.

It is in Germany’s interest to do everything possible to secure its own investments in Southern Africa. If the Chancellor is able to play a positive role in resolving the Zimbabwean stalemate she will not only protect existing German investments but create a vast reservoir of goodwill in Southern Africa. This in turn will enhance Germany’s trade and investment prospects in the region in future.

The long-term stability of South Africa depends in large part on its being able to achieve its medium to long-term economic growth targets. These in turn can be met only if medium- to long-term foreign direct investment goals are achieved. If the latter are not met, then South Africa’s growth targets will be missed and the high expectations of black working-class South Africans will be frustrated. This could destabilize South Africa. Furthermore, if South Africa’s economy falters, the entire SADC area will be affected. If that happens, it is inevitable that a region that has taken significant strides towards democracy and the opening up of its economy will suffer a setback. This would harm the political and economic security of Southern Africa.

Regrettably, Zimbabwe’s troubles have already had a negative effect on the region. Firstly, because long-term investors fear that South Africa may go the same way as Zimbabwe and replicate its decline into lawlessness and economic collapse, much potential long-term investment in South Africa and adjacent countries has been diverted to other parts of the world. Secondly in excess of 3 million Zimbabweans have gone into economic exile since 2000. The bulk of these people have moved to South Africa and Botswana. This has not only put additional burdens on those economies, but has driven up the rates of national unemployment and crime in those countries. If Zimbabwe implodes or explodes, the flood of refugees will become a tidal wave. Thirdly, Southern Africa’s inability (or reluctance) to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis has created a negative impression of the entire region in the eyes of international investors, thus retarding even short-term economic growth.

What should South Africa and Germany do?

One of the reasons why relations between the EU and SADC are strained, apparently irreconcilably so, is that the interests of the members of both bodies are too diverse to make it possible to establish a consensus about what should be done, and what policy adopted, to settle the Zimbabwean crisis. Accordingly it is not surprising that the lack of agreement should extend to the bodies themselves.

South Africa and Germany should seek to break the impasse, take the initiative in devising a plan to rescue Zimbabwe, and seek to drive the process. Because initiatives taken at the macro institutional level of the EU and SADC have failed owing to the diversity of members’ views, what is needed is to seek consensus between a few key countries in both the EU and SADC. The latter will be those that have the most to lose from the threatened implosion of Zimbabwe, namely South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana. Chancellor Merkel should use her position to develop a common understanding with President Mbeki, based on the mutual concern of the two leaders for the long-term political and economic stability of Southern Africa.

If a common position is agreed between Chancellor Merkel and President Mbeki and a plan of action decided on, they will have commit themselves not only to a determined and urgent diplomatic initiative but also to a shared commitment to prioritize Zimbabwe’s affairs. One of the reasons why diplomatic efforts to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis have failed so far is that it has always featured as an addendum to, not the focus of, the diplomatic agenda that the EU and SADC share. In other words, it is going to take unwavering and urgent focus and political commitment on the part of both leaders to carry out the initiative. Their plan of action can then be used to build first a consensus between the EU and SADC, and then to gain the consent of the member states of both regional institutions.

The mandate given to President Mbeki in March 2007 to mediate between Zanu PF and the opposition in Zimbabwe provides a unique opportunity for South Africa and Germany to build a consensus between the EU and SADC. SADC must obviously drive this process but Germany should be intimately involved behind the scenes as that could lay the foundation for a joint EU/SADC initiative to stabilise Zimbabwe immediately after the SADC mediation process has yielded fruit. And if the mediation fails Germany’s involvement can still lay the foundation for a new and firmer SADC initiative to resolve the crisis which would enjoy EU backing.

A Lesson from the past

The world has rightly laid most of the blame for the Zimbabwean catastrophe at the door of President Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF government. However the international community must accept that it is complicit in one respect. The international community’s failure to demand fundamental democratic reforms as a condition for assistance in the 1980s and 1990s has greatly contributed to the disastrous situation faced by millions of Zimbabweans today.

Instead of focusing on measures that would build genuinely democratic institutions and a democratic society in Zimbabwe billions of US dollars were poured into Zimbabwe in developmental aid with very few conditions attached. At the same time the international community ignored very serious deficiencies in governance and in so doing assisted in the perpetuation of the culture of impunity and violence which has plagued Zimbabwean society for so long. Other than the buildings and other structures constructed with this developmental aid there is very little to show now for all of that predominately Western taxpayers’ money. Indeed if the truth be told that taxpayers’ money simply consolidated ZANU PF’s power and has given the regime the ability to suppress its subjects as effectively as it has done in the last decade.

The humanitarian and economic crises are so severe now that there is a danger that the international community will once again act expediently without dealing with the root causes of Zimbabwe’s malaise. As calamitous as the situation is, Zimbabwe remains a country with enormous potential. But it will never reach that potential unless some hard decisions are taken and certain fundamental principles respected.

Key ingredients for the future

Any political settlement brokered by the international community must include the following essential ingredients if Zimbabwe is to reach its full potential.

1. A new democratic Constitution

At the very root of Zimbabwe’s problems is the highly deficient Constitution that emerged from the Lancaster House conference. In particular the vast disparity of power between the Executive on the one hand and the Legislature and Judiciary on the other hand has contributed to the gross abuse of office which has destroyed Zimbabwe. A new democratic Constitution must be agreed to, through a process embraced by all Zimbabweans. That Constitution must balance power among the three arms of government and must crucially ensure that the fourth estate, the media, is greatly strengthened. It must also create new institutions to support democracy, such as an Independent Electoral Commission.

Once the new constitution has been legislated and institutions mentioned above established the international community has a role to play by directing developmental assistance into strengthening those institutions.

2. Small Government

The undemocratic Lancaster house Constitution has enabled the Zimbabwean government to become all pervasive. Its tentacles extend into every aspect of society and indeed the notion of a large government which meddles in every aspect of Zimbabweans lives has become part of our culture. As has been vividly demonstrated in the last few months in the context of price controls, government’s involvement in the operation of every business, school, University and sporting institution has had deleterious consequences for the Zimbabwean economy. Any new constitution and democratic structure must recognise that large government has failed in Zimbabwe and there needs to be a new commitment to the ideal of small government. There needs to be a commitment to allow the business and private sectors generally the freedom to rebuild Zimbabwe, within of course the parameters of a democratic and fair order. It is hard to legislate for small government; for that ideal to be respected there needs to be a change in the mindset of the political leaders who take over any new government from ZANU PF.

3. Title must be respected

The vast majority of Zimbabweans live in reservoirs of poverty known as communal areas. None of the people living there have title to their land and their material circumstances have greatly deteriorated during the 27 years of ZANU PF rule. It has served the ruling elite well to keep these rural Zimbabweans subservient to them because paradoxically through poverty the ruling elite’s retention of power is ensured. Moeletsi Mbeki observed that the fundamental problem facing Africa’s development is the enormous power imbalance between the political elite and key private sector producers and that until the structural powerlessness of producers is addressed there will be no meaningful development in sub-Saharan Africa. He goes on to state:

“It is therefore necessary that peasants, who constitute the core of the private sector and sub-Saharan Africa, become the real owners of their primary asset: land.”

Zimbabwe is no different; in fact it is arguably the best example of the truth of the Mbeki’s statement. A commitment must be made to respect existing title and to extend title to the vast majority of Zimbabweans living in communal areas, in a manner though that will protect their livelihoods.

4. Truth Commission

It must be recognised that Zimbabwe cannot move forward without addressing its past. Whilst the fear that President Robert Mugabe and the ZANU PF ruling elite have of prosecution may be the single biggest obstacle to securing a peaceful transition to democracy, future stability in Zimbabwe will not be assured until the ghosts of the past have been laid to rest. The first necessary step in this process will be the establishment of a victim orientated Truth Commission which will provide an opportunity for victims to explain what has happened to them over several decades. It must also allow them to say what measures they believe are necessary to achieve meaningful justice and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It is important that such a Truth Commission should go back to 1965 when Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party announced its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). This is necessary because it must be acknowledged that the deepest root of Zimbabwe’s current problems goes back to the time when the intransigence of the then white minority government in the 1960s radicalized the Black Nationalist movement, which in turn set the stage for the bitter liberation struggle waged in the 1970s.

5. Zimbabweans in the Diaspora must be attracted back

The sine qua non for the restoration of Zimbabwe’s economy and institutions is the return to Zimbabwe of the millions of skilled Zimbabweans who have left Zimbabwe during the last three decades, especially in the last decade. Without their return no amount of balance of payments support or developmental assistance will return Zimbabwe to the state was in 10 years ago. Without their skills it will be impossible to grow the Zimbabwean economy so that it can reach its full potential.

The international community has a vital role to play in assisting Zimbabweans to return. Developmental assistance should be focused on identifying Zimbabweans in the Diaspora who have the needed skills to rebuild Zimbabwe, assisting them to return to Zimbabwe and to re-establish themselves.

6. Trade not Aid

Whilst in the short term Zimbabwe undoubtedly will need a massive injection of balance of payments support and developmental aid to get back on its feet, in the medium to long-term the international community should focus its attention on creating trading conditions with Zimbabwe which will resuscitate Zimbabwean businesses. As indicated above developmental assistance should be focused on governance issues to ensure that democracy is firmly rooted in Zimbabwean society. Zimbabwe in the past has had a vibrant and diverse economy and given democracy and less government interference there is no reason why in future Zimbabwe should not become a completely self-sufficient and prosperous nation. This will only happen however if the international community plays its role in ensuring that the private sector is enabled to drive the Zimbabwean economy and that the culture of dependence created by aid is broken.